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M\ost  of the Bank's adjustment lending programs have increased
the -rowth rate of G)P,  the ratio of exports to GDP, and the
ratios of saving to GDP. But the average ratio of investment to
GDP is lower  than 1970s levels.  Sometimiies  un1sustILainable
levels of public investmiienlt  in the 1970s had led to economiiic
crisis, and investmiient  had to beconme  mlore  efficient. To restore
growth, the challenge of the 1990s is to have good economlic
policies anld  to create the conlditions  needed to increase invest-
inlent-to-GDP  ratios.
I hc Poh ,, RRcser,h  a:i  I vernal A ffalr  o  (.mnpC X  d;:nhules  IPR  L Worklng Pie  rs 1 di*Nemrnate  thc  findinps of " ,rk  in prograss and
:r  (  ,-apv  :1  K  q X.1-Ure  I i a  -k  Pearvy sIzk*''  't  ,  (au  , \  -t  tEe  s  -t  ;\A't  :-.;'  I'C,'pzT  d'  I.C ):lC 
S .'  a:d),  S  X  z  ds  i  S  \  .**  '  ,  nns.afl!  cv  . .,flrS  arc  Lhe
















































































































dPolicy,  Research,  and  External  Affairs




T'his  paper  - a  product  of'thle  Macrocconiomic  Adjustment  and  Growth  Di\ision.  Country  F.cononltics
Department  - is  part  oi'  a largcr  cftort  in  PRE  to  asscss  thc  clfectivciless  ol'  ad(justimncit  lending.  'oCpics
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Simple  comparisons  o'  growtih  rates  in  countries  ratio  of'  investimicilt  to  GD)P  has  ,'allcn  below
that  have  had  at  least  two  structural  adjusiment  1970s  levels.
loans  (SALs)  or  at  least  threc  adjustincit  loans
(tlhc  first  onc  in  1985  or  betore),  show  that  lheir  Thc  drop  in  investmncilt's  shalre-  in  GDP  in
growth  has  improved  more  than  that  of  other  thc  initial  years  ol'  adjustmcnt  must  be  initcr-
countries.  prete(l  carefully.  In many  countrics,  cCoInIollic
crisis  was  the  result  of  unsustainable  levels  of
But  simple  comparisons  of  the  p.  ,ormancc  public  investment  reachcd  in  tlhc  1970s:  part  of'
of  groups  of  countries  aIrc poor  cstimattors  o'  thIc  the  neede(i  a(ijustiiieclt  was  rc(lucing  hligih Icvels
effectiveness  of'adjusimcnlt  programs  because  ol' inc'ficient  public  investimicnt.  Also,  the  initial
the  performance  oi'  an  adjusting  country  is  the  uncertainity  that  occurs  wheln  an  adjustment
result  of:  program  beginis  will  probably  slow  do\lon private
investmeinlt.
*  The  policies  thait  would  have  been  in  place
cven  without  adjustment  loans  f'rom  thc  Bank.  Despite  their  (disappointing  investment
performance,  these  countries  expericnccd  morc
*  World  economic  conditions.  ol'  an  increase  in  their  rates  of' GDP  growth  in
1985-88  than  in  1970-80.  This  miust  rielect  mioic
*  The  effccts  of  the  Bank-supported  program.  cfl'licient  invcstment  combined  with  increased
capalcity  utiliz.ation.
*Intctnal  shocks  to  the  economy  (sucil  as
drought,  wars,  and  earthquakes).  But  for  countries  that  havc  rcduced  miost  of'
ilicir policy inlef'ficieincies,  achicving an accept-
After  explicitly  controlling  for  external  able,  sustaina;lbie  grovw1th rate  in  thec  1990s  will
shocks  and  nonprogram  determinants  of' perfor-  require  highier  investnicnin  rates  than  those
mance,  Corbo  and  Rojas  find  that  adjustment  achieved  in  the  190s.  I'lic  chalilcnge  ol'lic
lcnding  programs  have  usually  increased  the  1990s  is  to  creatle  the  coniditionis  nec(ded  to
growth  rate  of  GDP  and  the  ratio  of'exports  to  generate  an  incrcasc  in  investnlenl-to-3DlP
GDP,  and  have  increased  the  saving-to-GDP  ratios.
ratio  over  early  1980s  levels.  But  the  average
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References  371.  Introduction
The purpose  of a  structural  adjustment  program  is to restore  sustainable
economic  growth  an6  wake  lasting  progress  in alleviating  poverty. The  process
is lengthy,  however,  often  with requirements  to control  inflation,  achieve  a
sustainable external balance,  change  incentives, create  or  strengthen
institutions,  mobilize  saving  and increase  investment. Control  of inflation
and  reduction  of the  external  deficit  are  usually  attempted  at the  beginning  of
the  program,  to lay  the  foundation  for  credible  macroeconomic  and  institutional
reform.  When enough  progress  has been achieved  with the inflation  and the
current  account,  structural  reform  to improve  resource  allocation  and  lift  other
impediments  to growth  are initiated.  Thus, an examination  of performance
indicators  one  or two  years  after  the  initiation  of  an  adjustment  effort  reveals
little  about  the  effectiveness  of  an  adjustment  program. Rather,  it  will likely
pick  up  the short-term  adjustment  costs  instead  of the  medium-  and long-term
adjustment  benefits. Case studies  of countries  where enough  time has passed
since the initiation  of the adjustment  effort  may permit a more complete
evaluation  of adjustment  programs. At the same  time,  even those  studies  need
to  look  beyond  the  characteristics  of  the  program  to  consider  as  well  as initial
conditions  in  the  country  (e.g.,  GDP  growth  and  the  ratios  of  investment,  saving
and  exports  to  GDP in the  period  before  the  program),  and internal  (e.g.,  the
policy  envirornment)  and  external  factors  (e.g.,  the  terms  of  trade,  international
real interest  rates  and access  to external  financing),  and to take them into
account  in assessing  effectiveness.
Evaluating  performance  in adjusting  countries  requires  measuring the
marginal  contribution  of  adjustment  programs  while  controlling  for  other  factors
that  affect  performance.  Thus,  the  contribution  of  an  adjustment  lending  program
is calculated  as the difference  between  actual  performance  and an estimated
counterfactual  scenario  of  what  would  have  happened  in  the  absence  of the2
program,  given  initial  conditions  in  the  country,  the  external  environment  facing
it  and  policies  in  the  pAriod  before  the  program  was initiated.  We approach  tte.
construction  oi  a  counterfactual  scenario  by  using  three  alternative  statistical
approaches: the standard  before-after  comparison,  the standard  control  group
comparison  and the  modified  control  group  comparison,  in which  we assess  the
effects  of  adjustment  lending  using  not  only  techniques  to  control  for  conditions
that influence  the effectiveness  of adjustment  measures  but also for country
characteristics  that  help  determine  the  decision  to  participate  in  an  adjustment
program.  In  sum,  the  initiation  of  an  adjustment  program  with  World  Bank  support
is seen as ea endogenous  decision  that is based on the benefits  the country
expects  from  the  program. 1
We use these three  approaches  to assess  if countries  that undertake  a
program  with the  World  Bank  have  performed  better  than they  would  have in the
absence of the adjustment  program.  Performance  and the effectiveness  of
adjustment  lending  are  evaluated  using  four  indicators:  rate  of growth  of GDP,
ratio  of  &aving  to  GDP,  ratio  of investment  to  GDP,  and  ratio  of exports  to  GDP.
We compare  the  value  of the  performance  indicators  in 1985-88--a  period  after
adjustment  was  initiated--with  performance  in  two  base  periods,  1970-80  and  1981-
84, for three groups of countries:  intensive  adjustment  lending (EIAL),
countries  that  have  received  two  or  more structural  adjustment  loans  (SALs)  or
three  or more adjustments  loans (SALs  or sectoral  adjustment  loans,  SECALs),
starting  in 1985 or before;  other adjustment  lending (OAL)--countries  that
started  a  program  after  1985  or  have  received  fewer  than  two  SALs  or fewer  than
three adjustment  loans in 1985  or before;  and no adjustment  lending (NAL), 2
countries  that  have  received  no adjustment  loans.
I  Econometric  or  CGE-type  models  are  usually  used  in
individual country studies of program effectiveness.  See,  for
example,  Corbo  and  de Melo  (1989), Condon, Corbo  and  de  Melo
(1990), and Bourguignon, Morrisson and Suwa (1990).
2  Table  A.1  in  the  Appendix  A lists  the  countries  in  each  group.3
2  Initia-l  Conditions. [sternal Shocks, Policy St-nce and a  First tookA  St
Initial conditions  and external  shocks  are important  determinants
performance  as well as of the demand  for adjustment  lending.  Sir-ilarly,  the
domestic  policies  before  and during  adjustm9nt  are also important. In fact,
countries  receiving  adjustment  lending  are  supposed  to  follow  policies  aimed  at
reducing  the current account deficit to a  level compatible  with normally
available  financing  while  minimizing  losses  in  output  and  employment  and  creating
the conditions  for sustainable  growth.  Fiscal,  monetary  and exchange  rate
pclicies  are the  key  macroeconomic  oneo  used for  adjustment  (most  of the  time
as part of an IMF program),  while the most common types of Bank-supported
structural  reforms  involve  institutional  and incentive  measures  in the  public
sector,  trade  policy  and  the  financial  system.
When  other  factors  are  controlled  for,  the  importance  of  initial  conditions
in the  performance  of a country  when it undertakes  a  program  is evident.  A
country  with better  initial  conditions  (e.g.,  higher  saving,  investment,  and
export  to  GDP  ratios,  a  lower  debt  to  GDP  ratio,  a  lower  fiscal  deficit  to  GDP,
less  inflation,  and  so  on)  has  a  better  chance  of  improving  its  performance  under
a given  adjustment  program  than  does  a country  with  worse initial  conditions.
Table  1  shows,  in  the  1970-80  period  base  the  EIAL  countries  had  relatively
high saving  and  investment  ratios. In contrast,  they  had the  highest  debt to
GDP  ratios  and  the  highest  rates  of  inflation.  In the  case  of  the  ratios  of  debt
to  exports  and  exports  to  GDP,  rate  of growth  of  GDP  and  fiscal  deficit  to  GDP,
the  EIAL countries  fell  between  the  OAL  and  NAL countries. The OAL  countries
had  the  highest  debt  to export  ratios,  and  the  lowest  saving  and  export  to  GDP
ratio  qnd  rate  of growth  of GDP.  In contra6t,  the  NAL  countries  had the  most
favorable  ranking  for  eight  of the  nine indicators.  In the 1981-84  period,  in
general  the  indicators  of initial  conditions  showed  a  similar  ranking  as  before,
except  for  rate  of growth  of GDP,  which  was lowest  in the  EIAL  countries  (see
Tables  2 and  3). However,  in  absolute  terms  the  indicators  for  debt,  inflation
and  GDP  growth  were  worse  for  the  three  groups,  especially  the  EIAL countries.
Thereafter,  based  on  the  review  of  initial  conditions  in  each  group  of  countries,
it appears  that  on average  the  NAL  countries  did  not  need  adjustment,  while  the4
EIAL  countries  did  quite  wel'l  in  the  1970s  except  in  the  case  of  debt  indicatols.
However,  in the 1931-84  period,  the  demand  for  adjustment  lending  by the  EIAL
countries  seems  to  have  been  a  mixture  of  debt  problems  and  the  worst  indicators
ir  *erms  of  inf'ation  and  ;DP growth.
Even  if  initial  conditions  had  been  the  same  in  the  various  country  groups,
the  differences  in  the  intensity  with  which  they  experienced  the  external  shocks
could  have  affected  the  economic  performance  of  countries  that  were implementing
adjustment  programs. The developing  countries  in the 1980.  faced  an external
environment  that combined  a world recession,  the  highest  real interest  rates
since  the  Great  Depression,  declining  and  often  volatile  terms  of trade  fcr  many
countries,  and, in the case  of many  middle-income  countries,  a sudden  cut-off
from  international  financial  markets. Table  4  presents  the  effect  of  the  terms
of trade  and  interest  rate shocks  only.  A comparison  of 1981-84  with 1970-80
shows  how  large  the  external  shocks  in  the  early  1980s  were:  both  EIAL  and  NAL
countries  suffered  an average  annual  loss  of close  to 12%  of 0.DP  in 1980,  the
OAL countries  about  5%.  In contrast,  when comparing  the  period  1985-88  with
the  period  1981-84,  the  EIAL countries  were the only  group  that  experienced  a
positive  external  shock. However,  th 1's positive  shock  followed  a  much larger
deterioration  in the  early  1980s.
External  financing  fromi  non-official  sources  to  the  ELAL  and  OAL  countries
dropped  substantially  after  the 1981-82  period,  just  when they  were being  hit
by large  terms  of trade and interest  rate shocks.  If the negative  external
shocks  of the early 1980s  had been judged  as taporary, the EIAL and OAL--
principally  middle-income  countr.es--could  have  pursued  the  standard  option  of
using  foreign  reserves  and  foreign  borrowing  to  avoid  adjustment.  This  response
would have been proper.  However,  with the exception  of IMF and World Bank
borrowing--which  was conditional  on the adoption  of an adjustment  program--
foreign  borrowing  was  difficult  to  obtain  after  August  1982. Moreover,  once  it
became  clear the adverse  external  environment  would continue  for some time,
countries  had  to adjust. For  countries  that  were ready  to initiate  adjustment
programs,  the access  to financing  from international  financial  institutions
allowed  them  to  make  progress  toward  achieving  internal  and  external  balance  by5
gradually implementing  structural  adjustment  policies,  assisted by foreign
commercial  borrowing. 3 Table 5  shows that EIAL countries suffered  severe
reductions  in  non-ofcicial  flows  of  external  financing  after  1982,  while  the  HAL
countries  continued  to receive  an important  amount  in terms  of GDP.  That fact
helps  explain  why  the  NAL  countries  ui-d  not  use  adjustment  lending  even  when  the
total  external  shock  they  faced  in 1981-84  was also  majo.
Country  Performance
To compare  the  performance  of  the  EIAL,  OAL  and  NAL countries,  we analyze
four indicators  of progress in macroeconomic  adjustment--real  GDP growth,
domestic  caving  over  GDP, investment  over  GDP,  and exports  over  GDP--in  three
periods,  1970-80 (first),  1981-84 (second)  and  1985-88 (third).  Although
judgment  of the effectiveness  of an adjustment  program  cannot  be based  on a
simple  comparison  of  observed  performance,  nevertheless  the  before-after  approach
is  useful  in underlining  what  happened  in  the  country  groups. 4
Table  2 shows  that  for  the  EIAL  countries  the  rate  of GDP  growth  dropped
substantially  from  1970-80  to 1981-84  but  then  recovered  in 1985-88.  In the  OAL
and  NAL  countries,  the  rate  of  growth  dropped  on average  between  the  first  and
secon,d  periods  and then stayed  almost  constant  between  the second  and third.
A drastic  reduction  in the  rate of growth  of GDP  between  the  first  and second
periods  was common  to  all  the  country  groups  but  was greatest  for  the  EIAL. 5
3  The  World  Bank  introduced  adjustment  lending  in  1980  Lo facilitate  this
adjustment.  The  main  rationaie  was  that  a substantial  adjustment  could  be  made
easier  and  its  cost  reduced,  by  spreading  it  over  time  In  particular,  to  expand
exports  requires  time  to build  export  capacity  and  develop  marketr.  (See  Corbo
and  Fischer  1990.)
4  As  we explain  in Section  3, the  before-after  comparison  is a  very  poor
measure  of  program  effects.  H,wever,  it  does  provide  measures  of  actual  changes
in given  indicators.
5  Table  A.2,  which  presants  the  performance  of each EIAL  country  in the
three  periods,  shows  that  only  13  of  the  25 ELAL  zountries  had  a  higher  average
growth  rate  in the  third  period  than  in  the  first  period.  This  table  also  shows
a  wide variation  in  performance,  indicating  that  a  variety  of factors  seem  to
have  been  determining  performance.  Whl'e,  a  comparison  of the rates  of growth
of  GDP  for  the  second  and  third  periods  tell  us  that  22  out  of 25  EIAL  countries
improved performance.  Often, the  improvement  in the  external environment
accounted  for  part  of  this  improvement,  but  the  effect  of  the  programs  could  have
been  just  as important.6
The investment  to CDP ratio  in the EIAL and OAL countries  decreased  on
average  continuously  from  the  first  to  the  third  periods.  For  the  MAL  countries,
the  ratio  rose  between  tho  first  and  second  periods  and  fell  betvwon  the  second
and  third  periods. 6
Domestic  saving  as  a s:re  of  GDP  dropped  by  3.9  percentage  points  betvwen
the first  and second  periods  and  thea recovered  2.4  percentago  points  betwoen
the  second  and third  periods  in the EIAL countries. In contrast,  in the  NAL
countries,  although  the  drop  betwoen  the first  and  second  periods  vas  similar,
the  recovery  was only  0.42  of  GDP.7
The export  to  GDP ratio  of the  EIAL  countries  improved  continuously  from
the first  to the third  periods,  increasing  by almost  4 percentage  points  on
average. 8 To assess  the  effect  of extrome  observations  we also  ueed indicators
of rank (first  quartile,  median  and  third  quartile). There  is no evidence  of
extreme  observations  distorting  the  information  provided  by  the  central  tendency
measures,  except  in  the  case  of the  export  to  GDP  ratio.
Policy  Stance
To  sei  how  the  policy  stance  changed  in  the  EIAL  countries,  we examine  four
indicators--the  real exchange  rate, whe inflation  rate, and the fiscal  and
resource  balance  deficits  as shares  of GDP (Table  3).  Although  a government
cannot  directly  control  the real effective  exchange  rate or inflation  rate,
fiscal,  monetary and exchange  rate policies affect their evolution.  For
countries  that  had  to  reduce  their  current  account  deficits,  a substantial  real
devaluation  was an important  component  of successful  adjustment.  For many
6  When comparing 1985-88  with 1970-80,  the investment  share in GDP
decreased or stayed constant in every country but Korea, Costa Rica and
Mauritius.  Between  1981-84  and  1985-88,  the  ratio  of investment  to  GDP  increased
in  only  7 of the  25 EIAL  countries.
7  As shown  in  Table  A.2, between  the  first  and third  pe iods the  saving
retes  in 10  out  of  25  EIAL  countries  rose. When  comparing  periods  two  and  three,
the  domestic  saving  rates  increased  in 16  of the  25 EIMA  countries.
8  In 15  out  of  25  EIAL  countries,  the  export  to  GDP  ratio  improved  between
the first  and third  periods.  Between  1985-88  and 1981-84,  the export  to GDP
ratio  increased  in 17  of the  25  EIAL  countries.7
countries  jfter  1982, it was  available  financing rather  than poli.les  that
determined the evolution of their reeource balance.  Therefore, the resource
balance in the post 1982 period is more a constraint than a policy variable.
The  comparison of  1981-82 with  1970-80 shows that  the EIAL countries
experienced an increase in the fiscal deficit as a  share of GDP, appreciation
of  their currencies,  an  increase  in their average  inflation  rates.  and an
increase in their average resource balance deficits.  After 1981-82, in general
the  EIAL  councries improved  their  fiscal  situation  and  achieved a  continuous  real
depreciation.  Nevertheless, average inflation rose constantly, the result of
the greater monetization of their (smaller) fiscal deficits.  The middle-income
EIAL  countries with  large  external public  debts  adjusted  their  budgets  in
response to the sharp drop in their capacity to borrow abroad, but at the same
time their interest payments on existing external debt were  increasing, and
government  revenues were  suffering  from the worsened  terms of  trade.  The
resource balance deficit as a share of GDP fell in the EIAL countries by more
than half on average between 1981-82 and 1983-84.
To deal with  the fiscal crisis starting  in 1981-82, the typical EIAL
country  cut its  public  expenditures  (usually  by  drastically  reducing  investment),
increased  its  revenue and  relied  more on domestic  financing  of the  budget deficit
(via domestic interest-bearing debt or credit from the central bank).  Bail-
outs of firms hit hard by the large devaluations and the recession complicated
the fiscal situation further.  Fl.cal adjustment  was usually a prerequisite for
improving internal  macroeconomic stability and was usually at the heart of the
structural adjustment program.  For the EIAL countries, the resource balance
deficit as a share of GDP declined continuously after 1981-82.
The "AL countries also showed a mj'J deterioration in all four policy
indicators  between 1970-80  and 1981-82.  Then, there  was an increase in  the rate
of inflation  between 1981-82  and 1983-84  without  much change  in  the real  exchange
rate and the fiscal situation.  They nevertheless made progress between 1983-
84 and 1985-88 in achieving real devaluations, and in reducing their resource
balance deficits as shares of GDP.8
On the other hand, economic policy  before 1980 was  better  in the NAL
countries than in  other countries.  After 1981-82,  however, their real exchange
rates appreciated substantially and their policy indicators and real growth of
GDP worsened  (Table  2).
3.  Statistical Analysis of Country Performance
The Before-After Approach
This approach consists  of comparing a given ind:cator  of  performance after
a specific program was put in place with periormance prior to t  program.  The
before-after  estimator is  simply  the  mean change in  the  target  variable over some
relevant per..od.  With Ay the change in the target  variable between the p-ogram
period and the previous period, the simple before-after estimator (p)  involves
calculating the mean change acrobs the group of program countries for each of
the macroeconomic outcome variables that  we want to  analyzes:
Ayj - 0  for alie  P  (1)
where P denotes the set of program countries.  Thus, any change in a  target
variable in a  program country (or in  a  group of program countries) is attributed
exclusively to the program.  The significance of this estimator, /3,  is usually
tested through the  standard t-test, and in some cases using non-parametric
statistical tests.
Although  the  before-after  approach has  been  the most  popular  in  the
literature on the effects of programs, the res.its are likely to be biased and
inconsistent.  The main problem with  this approach is that it embodies the
implicit assumption of "other  things being equal,"  which is  highly implausible.
Specifically, it is  difficult to  determine  whether observed changes in, say, the
GDP growth rate can be ascribed to a Bank su-orted-program  or to other non-
program factors that have not been held fixed in the analysis.  This  point is
crucial because in our period of  analysis, these non-program determinants,
especially terms of trade and international interest rates,  have changed  widely9
from year to year and country to country. If we define the effectiveness of a
program cs thes  difference between the actual macroeconomic performance observed
under a  program and the performance that  would have been expected  in che  absence
of  the  program, 9 the  before-after  approach  is  a  poor  estimator  of  this
counterfactual scenario, because the situation prevailing before the program is
not likely to be a good predictor of  what would have happened in the absence of
a program, given that non-program determinants are changing frcm year  to year.
9  Thi6  definition  was used in  Goldstein  and  Montiel (1986)  and  Khan (1988).10
Control-Group  Approach
The control-group approach is  designed to overcome, in  part, the inability
of the before-after approach  to distinguish between program and non program
(!eterminants  of macroeconomic  outcomes.  This  procedure basically  uses  the
behavior of a control group (a  group of non-program countries) to estimate what
would  have  happened  in  the program  group  in the  absence  of programs.  It
implicitly assumes that the only difference between the program and non-program
groups is that countries in the former group of countries aro  undertaking a
program.  The control-group approach still assumes, however, that program and
non-program countries are subject to the same non-program determinants, i.e.,
they face the same external environment and the effect on performance of these
other determinants is the same for  both groups of  countries.  This approach also
ignores the effecto of pre-program characteristics on performance.
The  control-group  estimator  is  calculated  by  running  the  following
regression for the sample of program and non-program countries:
Ayi - o0  + flIdi  for all  i e  Q  t9)
where Q denotes the set of program and nonprogram countries and di is a dummy
variable with a value of cne for program countries.  The estimated value of PI
is equa. to the difference in the mean  changes in the target variables  for
program and non-program countries.  Thus, a  statistically significant  value for
01  would thus indicate that the change in the target variable for the program
country was different from the corresponding change in that variable for non-
program countries (the control group).
This approach controls for the effect of changes in the global economic
environment, but it assumes that such global factors affect program and non-
program countries  equally.  This assumption  introduces  a  bias, however,  whenever
program countries differ systematically from  non-program countries.  This point
is important for performance evaluation.
If the determinants of program selection are positively correlated with
the  non-program  determinants  of  change in  the  macroeconomic  target  variables  that21
would  have  occurred  in  the  absence  of a  program,  the control-group  estimate  of
the  program  effects  will overstate  the  actual  program  ones.  In short,  if the
program  countries  are  more  likely  to  have  experienced  negative  temporary  shocks
in the pre-program  period,  a comparison  of the changes  in mean macroeconomic
outcomes  between  program  and  non-program  countries  will most likely  overstate
the  true  independent  effect  of  the  program.  A  negative  shock  in  the  pre-program
period  simultaneously  increases  the  probability  of participation  in  the  program
and the probability  of a  positive  change  in the target  variable,  Yi, in the
program  period.  Thus, attributing  all the improvement  in Yi to a  program
overstates  its real effect.  This kind of bias,  known in the literature  as
sample-selectivity  bias,  will be zero  if the  determinants  of program  selection
are  uncorrelated  with the  determinants  of  macroeconomic  performance  or  when the
program  group  has  been  randomly  selected. Only  in  these  case  will the  control-
group  approach  estimator  be an unbiased  indicator  of the  program  effect.
A Modified  Control-Group  Estimator
TIare are several  estimators  that resolve  the sample-selectivity  bias.
One  of them  is obtained  from  the  modified  control-group  approach. 10 The  basic
idea  is  to  accept  the  non-random  selection  of  program  countries,  to identify  the
differences  between  program  and  non-program  countries  in  the  pre-program  period
and then to contriA  for these  differences  in the comparison  with subsequent
economic  performance. Furthermore,  the  modified  control  group  approach  also
control  for  world  economic  conditions  and  the  stance  of  country  policies  without
program.
The  modified  control-group  approach  starts  from  the  basic  equation  for  the
macroeconomic  target  variable  in  country  i  in  level  form  (equation  [31)  instead
of  using  the  first  difference  form  that  applied  in  the  before-after  and  control-
group  approaches. Thus,  in  period  3  we have the  following  equation:
yi  - Xi'w  +  Wi'a  +  04di +  ei  (3)
10  Goldstein  and Montiel (1986)  outline  a procedure  for removin  the
sample-selectivity  bias from control-group  estimates  of the effects of the
program  when the  selection  of program  countries  is  non-random.12
where xi is a R-element vector of macroeconomic policy instruments that would
have been observed in the absence of a program in country i;  Wi is an M-element
random vector of world non-program variables relevant to country i; and di is
a dxmry variable that takes the value of unity if a country has a  program and
the  value of zero otherwise.11  Equation (3)  says that the level of the targeted
results will be a  function of four factors:  (i) the value of soelected  policy
instruments that would have occurred in the absence of e  program, x; (ii) the
change in selected world economic conditions, W; (iii) the total effects of a
Bank-supported program if the country has a program in place, d; and (iv) a
range of unobservable shocks that are specific to country i, ei.
The complete policy vector x can be generated by estimating equation 4,
the policy reaction function: 12
Ax, - [yid _  (y4 )-1]7  +  ui  (4)
where yid is the desired  value of the  vector yi and ui is  the unobservable error
term.  This equation says that  policymakers  display a systematic policy reaction
to  perceived  disequilibria  in  their macroeconomic  target variables.  More
specifically, it  says  that  the  change  in country  i's macroeconomic  policy
instruments between the current and previous period will be a function of the
difference between the desired value of the macroeconomic target variables in
this period and their actual  value in the preceding period.  y is the  vector of
the coefficients that indicates the responsiveness  of the policy instruments  to
such target disequilibria.
11  To avoid  a potential  specification error we  also  included in our
estimation a predetermined durmmy  that takes a value of one for countries with
an IMP program in 1985 or before.  Of our sample of 25 intensive adjustment
countries, 23 undertook a program with  the IMF before that they undertook a
program with  the World Bank.  Of other two, only one, Nigerio, undertook a
program  with the IMP after 1985--during 1987--while  Colombia has not undertaken
a program with the IMP in 1985 or since.
12  As x represents the counterfactual scenario--the policies that would
have been undertaken in the absence of the program--it is directly observable
only for non-program countries and must be estimated for program countries.13
In  practice,  as  Goldstein  and  Montiel  (1986)  mention,  an  important
limitation of  the modified  control-group estimator  is that  such a  reaction
function nay be highly unstable both across countries and in a  given country
over time so that, in the extreme case of instability, the problem of estimating
the counterfactual scenario becomes insoluble.
The model is completed with equations (5)  to (7):
Zi  [  Yi  - (Yi)_l)6  +  Wi  (S)
di - I if zi >  Z*  (6)
di - 0 if zi 5  z  (7)
where  zi is a random variable  that serves as the  index of  country-specific
characteristics that determines the proba',ility  of country i having a  program
during a given period; z* is the threshold value of the z that divides progr&m
from non-program countries and wi  is an unobservable error term.
The first step in estimating xi for the program countries is to fit the
reaction function to observable data for the non-program countries.  The only
unobserved variable in equation (4) is the country-specific vector of desired
macroeconomic outcomes, yd . As Goldstein and Montiel (1986)  maintain, if this
variable can be assumed to be constant over time, it can be captured by a set
of country-specific constants (yoi)  so that equation (4) is now
Axi  - 1oi - Y(yi)jK +  ui  . (8)
If both the setting of the policy instruments in equation (8) and the
acceptance  by a country of a program as specified  in equation (5)  reflect  policy
decisions of the government, any unobservable factors, Wi  that make a given
country  more likely to  resort  to  official  assistance,  such  as a  specific  program,
may also lead  it  to adopt a different policy package in the absence of the
program,  in  contrast to another  country  facing  similar  observable  circumstances.14
Thus,  if  the  model  presents  a  correlation  between  the  error  terms i  in  equation
(5)  and  ui in  equation  (4),  the  behavior  of  the  non-program  countries  would  not
be a good guide  to the  counterfactual  scenario  in the  program  countries.  If
such  a  correlation  is  present,13  then  equation  (8)  will  provide  a  biased  estimate
of  axi  for  the  program  countries,  unless  we assume  something  with  respect  to  the
errors  w, and  ui.  The  method  of  estimation  that  we use in this  paper  does  not
require  any  extra  assumption  with respect  to the  relationship  between  the  error
terms  of  equations  (4)  and (5)  (more  on this  point  below).1 4
By subtracting  (yi)_ 1 from  both  sides  of equation  (3)  and  substituting  xi
by  equation  (8),  our  model  for  estimating  the  effects  of  a  specific  program  is:15
y-  + 0 1 (yi)-l  +  6 2 (xi)-l+  +  +  P4 di  +  ci  (9)
13 In  their  estimations  of  the  model,  Goldstein  and  Montiel  (1986),  assume
that  both error  terms  are  uncorrelated.
14  See  Heckman  (1979).
15  Equation  (9)  is the  reduced  form  used  by Goldstein  and  Montiel  (1986)
to estimate  the  effects  of the  IMF  program.15
However, the  dummy  variable included  on the right  side  of the  equation that
measures the effect of the program in country i is endogenous.  The choice cf
countries  to  undertake  a  specific  program  principally  depends  on  their
expectation of  better performance with  respect to  the target macroeconomic
variables, Yi.  Thus, we would expect that the coefficient of the effect of the
program should be biased and inconsistent in the model used by Goldstein and
Montiel (1986).  This kind of bias can also be called self-selectivity, because
the data are generated by the self-selection of the countries.
To  resolve  this  selectivity bias,  Barnow, Cain  and Goldberger  (1981)
discuss several consistent estimators for in this situation.  The method used
here essentially  treats di as an endogenous variable  and uses  instrumental
variables to correct for the bias.16  The first stage consists of estimating a
status equation that determines whether or not the country should undertake a
program. We estimate the following equation using the probit ML method
P(di  - 1) - 0( 6 0  +(yi)_ 1
6 +  (xi)_lw +  W'O +  R'0] - *[Vi#l  (10)
where 0( I denotes  the standard  normal  cumulative  distribution,  W  is an M-
element random  vector of  world non-program  variables and  R is  an  N-element  vector
of individual  country  characteristics,  such as if the country  is low-income,
has a recurrent  program  with the  IMF,  has  had  an important  internal  shock,  and
so on.  In the second  stage  we use the  value of the  probability  of that the
country  will undertake  a program  with the  World  Bank,  calculated  with equation
(10),  as  an  instrument  for  di  in  the  estimation  of  equation  (9). The  probability
of the  country  undertaking  a specific  program,  calculated  by the  probit  model,
is
di  - aocVn17  (11)
16  See also Heckman (1978).16
Thus, using an instrumental variables technique in the estimation of equation
(9),  with a,  as  an  instrument  of  di,17  allows  us  to  obtain  a  consistent  estimate
of  34,  the coefficient of the effectiveness of the program.18
4.  Overview of the Data
All the data used in our analysis are taken from the World Bank's ANDREX
data b'Ase  except the real exchange rate,  which comes from IMF calculations.  We
consider a sample  that contains  observations from  77 developing countries during
the 1970-88 sample period.  They are ones for  which data are available for all
relevant macroeconomic variables for the period 1970-88.  We work with the data
in current and constant prices.  Because most EIAL countries carried out a real
depreciation in 1985-88,  the relative  price of investmen!  goods and exports rose
relative to the early 1980s.  Therefore, to measure the contribution of growth
in the supply response of exports, it is better to work with the investment to
GDP  and export  to GDP ratios in  constant  prices.  For completeness and to  satisfy
the adding up condition  we also  work with saving ratios at constant prices.  For
purposes of  this analysis, the countries were  grouped  into two categories:
EIALs, the program countries and a "control" group--the non-program countries-
-consisting of OALs and NALs.  The OAL's are considered non-program countries
because they have received too few adjustment loans during the period analysed.
The  sample period was,  as noted, divided  into three periods:  1970-80
(first), 1981-84 (second)  and 1985-88 (third),  with the latter corresponding to
the adjustment period.  We  compare performance in this third period  in the
program countries with respect some counterfactual scenario of what would have
17  This  solution  to  the  sclectivity-bias problem  of  an  instrumental
variable method means that we  do not have to assume  that the error terms of
equations (4) and (5)  are uncorrelated.
18  The instrumental variable method used here is  more efficient than the
two-stage least squares  method suggested  by Barnow, Cain and  Goldberger (1981),
principally because the robustness of the two-stage method depends on the  well
specification of the status equation and on the distribution assumption  made in
the estimation of equation (10) more than the instrumental variable procedure
does.  In addition, with the instrumental variable estimation, we do not need
to correct the standard errors obtained from equation (9),  while the standard
errors o'4tained  from a two-stage least squares estimation must be corrected.
Because  di has  been estimated,  the  standard errors underestimate  the  true
standard errors.17
happened in the absence of an adjustment  program.  We use four indicators:  rate
of GDP growth ind  the  ratios of gross  domestic saving,  gross investment and total
exports to GDP.  For each of these indicators  we calculate simple averagea in
each period.  Thus, for each country J, we have observations for variable i in
periods one, two and three.  (A complete list of the variables  used in the
analysis is presented in Appendix A.)
5.  The EmRirical Results
In  both the control-group  and  modified control-group  approaches we compare
the performance of our four indicators in 1985-88  with performance in 1970-80
and 1981-84 for the program and non-program groups of countries.1 9
Table 5.1A and 5.1B report the results of the control-group estimates.
Under this criterion for program evaluation and working in current prices, we
find that  the coefficients of the  program effects are statistically significant
for the rate of GDP growth and exports to GDP ratio: they show an improvement
in the program period (1985-88) in relation to the periods (one and two).  In
contrast, the other two indicators do not show significant improvement with
respect to any of the previous periods (Table 5.1A).  When working at constant
prices,  only  the  change  in  the  average  rate  of  growth  is  positive  and
statistically significant.  The investment to GDP ratio shows a substantial
decrease with respect to the period 1970-80.  In contrast, the changes in the
saving to GDP and export to GDP ratios are not significant.  Thus, if we were
to  use  only  the  results  from  the  control-group  approach  to  evaluate  the
adjustment lending  program,  we would conclude that it led  to improvements in  the
rate of GDP growth and the current price ratio of exports to GDP.  In the case
of the constant  price ratios, the investment  ratio  decreased  with respect to the
period  1970-80, while  the change  in the other ratios was  not  statistically
significant.  As we mentioned in Section 3, the control-group estimates are an
inconsistent estimator of  the program's effects unless  the determinants  of
19 The  relevant  period of  comparison  would be the  period  before the  program
was put in place, but as some programs were initiated in the early 1980s, the
1970-80 is a better base period.  In any case,  we report results for both base
periods.18
program  selection  are  uncorrelated  with  the  determinants  of  macroeconomic
performance or the program group is selected randomly.  There are good a  priori
reasons for believing that the assignment of countries to the program and non-
program groups is not random.
The inconsisteotcy  of the control-group  estimates is ovet-o.  e  here by using
the  modified control-group estimates presented in Section 3.  Table 5.2  presants
the  maximu-m  likelihood probit estimates  of the coefficients  of the participation
status function, equation  (10).  If a country decided  to participate  in an
adjustment  program in  the period 1981-84,  then  we assume that the only important
variables in  that decision  were the  value of  the  external shock  during the  period
1981-84 (period two) with respect to 1970-80 (period one), SHOCK1; the change
in the ratio of the current account surplus to GDP between periods one and two,
CACC6; the change in non-official external financing over GDP between periods
one and two,  NETF6; the change in  the ratio of total debt to GDP between periods
one and two, DEBT6; the level of investment in period 2, INV2; the level of  the
real exchange rate in period 2, RER2; and a group of dummy variables--if the
country had a program with the IMF, Dl, if it is an African country, D2, if it
is a Latin American country, D3, if it is a middle-income country, D6, and if
it has a rate of inflation of over 60% per year in period 2, DINFLAC.20
All the coefficients of the participation equation (10) have the expected
signs except the coefficient of change in the ratio of non-official external
financing  to  GDP between periods  one and  two,  NETF6.  We expected that a  positive
change  in this  variable decreases  the  probability that a country  would undertake
an adjustment program with  the World Bank.  However, the coefficient is not
significant.  The rest of the coefficients are significant except for dummy
variables D2 and D6.  Table 5.2 also presents the  pseudo-R 2, defined by McFadden
(1974)  as a measure of the goodness of fit of the  ML probit estimation.
20  The dummy variable DINFLAC is defined  with a value of one if a countr
has a rate of inflation of over 60Z per year in  period two.  Countries  with high
levels of inflation are expected to be less likely to undertake a  program,
because before receiving a loan from the World Bank, they need to make enough
progress in reducing their internal disequilibrium.19
Consistent estimates of the coefficients of the target equation (9) are
obtained using instrumental variables, with da as an instrument for di  Since
we are  working with grouped data, we calculate the robust White standard errors
that  are consistent under the  possibility of heterokedasticity.  The results are
presented in Tables 5.3A and 5.3B.21
After  explicitly  controlling for  the size of  the external  shock,  the
initial conditions and the policies followed in the pre-program period by each
country,  we find  that the  adjustment  programs  have  had a positive and  significant
effect on the rate of growth of GDP.22 This finding is  verified when comparing
performance in  1985-88 with  1970-80 and 1981-84.  The change  in the annual
average rate  of GDP growth in  the EIAL  countries  was 1.6  percenatage  points higher
than that the in all the other countries  when measuring changes  with respect to
1970-80.  When measuring differences with respect to 1981-84, the adjustment
programs are  estimated  to have  boosted  the rate  of  GDP growth  by  about  2
percentage points.  In other words,  adjustment does seem to have  caused an
increase in GDP growth relative to the early 19809.
Note, however, that this average result for the EIAL countries involves
an aggregation of successful and unsuccessful adjustment programs.  Typically,
the successful adjustment programs improved the rate of growth as a result of
higher export growth, which more than offset the effects of the contractionary
policies.  In other  zuntries,  resources  did not snift rapidly enough from  non-
tradable to tradable activities to increase growth, probably because of market
distortions and institutional  weaknesses.
23
The estimations of equation (9) for the ratio of domestic saving to GDP
find a positive and significant coefficient of program effects when comparing
21  For the modified control-group approach we report the results for the
ratios in constant prices only.
22  In the results (showr in Tables 5.3A and 5.3B)  we are only interested
in identifying the effect of Bank programs.  Some of the coefficients for the
other variables on the right-hand side are most of the time not statistically
significant, in part because of high collinearity.
23  Because in  many of the countries in our sample IMF programs were also
in place, we used a dummy for the presence of the IMP program.  However, the
dummy was never significant, and the results for the effectiveness of Bank-
supported programs were practically identical  to the ones without the dummy.20
with the  period 1981-84  but  an insignificant  effect  when contrary  with the  period
1970-80.  When comparing 1985-88  with 1981-84, the increase  was 3.7 percentage
points of GDP more for the EIAL than for the other countries.
In the case of the investment  to  5DP ratio, the adjustment  programs appear
to have led to a  statistically significant drop of 3.5 percentage points of GDP
between 1970-80 ind  1985-88, whereas  the effect betveen  1981-84 and 1985-88
was small and  not significant.  The impact  of the programs on investment  should,
however, be interpreted carefully.  Since adjustment is  not estilatd to have
reduced growth, it  must have increased  the average efficiency  of investment  and
utilization of capital.  For countries where an  integral  component of their
adjustment  programs  was to  curtail  low-efficiency  public (and  private) investment
programs, a decrease in the investment rate  was part of adjustment.  The result
is  nonetheless  worrisome, since in  most countries the achievement  of sustainable
higher growth paths is likely to require an increase in physical capital (and
human capital) investment above the average levels of the eighties.
Finally, when  controlling  fot other  factors, the  coefficients of  the
program effects indicate that the programs also had a  positive and significant
effect on the export to GDP ratio, equal to about 6.5 percentage points of GDP
between 1970-80  and 1985-88  and 2.5  percentage  points of GDP between 1981-84  and
1985-88.21
From this analysis  we conclude that the  ad4ustment lending  programs in the
EIAL countries have contributed to higher CDP growth and higher export to GDP
ratios, and the saving to GDP ratio has improved with  respect to the values
reached in  the early 1980s.  However, the investment to GDP ratio  has decreased
on average for program countries over the level reached in the seventies. 24
6.  Conclusions
Simple  comparisons  of the  growth  rates  in the  countries  that  have had  at
least  two  SAL8 or at least  three  adjustment  loans,  with the first  one in 1985
or before,  show  that their  growth  has improved  relative  to that of the other
countries.  However,  simple  comparisons  of  the  performance  of  groups  of  countries
are  poor  estimators  of the  effectiveness  of adjustment  programs. The  reason  is
that  the  performance  of an  adjusting  country  results  from  (i)  the  policies  that
would have been in place in the absence  of adjustment  lending  from the Bank,
(ii)  world  economic  conditions,  (iii)  the  effects  of  the  Bank-supported  program
and (iv)  shocks  to the  economy  (such  as  droughts  and  earthquakes).  To  isolate
the  net contribution  of Bank-supported  programs.  it is  necessary  to "control"
for  non-program  determinants  of  performance.
When the external  shocks  and conditions  that determine  the demand  for
adjustment  programs  are explicitly  controlled  for, the evidence  shows that
adjustment  lending  programs  have  usually  increased  the  rate  of  growth  of  GDP  and
exports  to  GDP ratio  and  increased  the  saving  to  GDP  ratio  with respect  to the
level reached in the early 1980s,  and have decreased  the average ratio of
investment to GDP over the level reached in the reventies. 25
The drop in the share of investment  in GDP in the initial  years of
adjustment  has to be interpreted  carefully. In  many countries  their  economic
24 When  working  with  ratios  at  current  prices,  the  changes  in  GDP  growth,
saving/GDP  and export/GDP  are statistically  significant  with respect  to both
periods.  In contrast,  the change in investment/GDP  was negative  but not
statistically significant  with respect to both base periods.
25  Conway  (1990),  using  another  statistical  approach  for  a  sample  of 76
developing  countries,  also concludes  that there  is a significant  association
between  participation  in  a  World  Bank  adjustment  lending  program  on the  one  hand
and  more rapid  real  economic  growth,  improved  current  account  as a  percentage
of GNP  and  lower  ratio  of domestic  investment  to GNP  on the  other.22
crisis resulted from a level of public investment reached in the 1970s that  was
unsustainable.  Part of the  needed adjustment  was a  reduction in the high levels
of  inefficient  public  investment.  For  private  Investment,  the  initial
uncertainty that occurs when an adjustment program is started most like.'y  will
result in a slowdown of  investment.  Despite their disappointing investment
performance, the EIAL countries experienced an increase in their rates of CDP
growth in 1985-88 relative to 1981-84  and 1970-80.  This result must  reflect an
increase  in the  efficiency  of investment  combined  with an incrsca!  in capacity
utilization. However,  for countries  that have reduced  most of their policy
inefficiencies,  achieving  a sustainable  and acceptable  rate of growth  in the
1990s will  require investment rates higher than those achieved in  the  early
eighties.  The  challenge  in the 1990s  is to create  the conditions  needed  to
generate  an  increasa  in  the  investment  to  GDP ratios. 2 6
26  The role of policies in generating a rise in investment is discussed
in Serven and Solimano (1990).TABLE  1
INITIAL  CONDITIONS
(period  average.  1970-80)
1  2  3  4  S  8  7  8  9
REAL  FISCAL  ANNUAL  AVG.  RATE  DOI.ESIIC  INVESTMEWT  EXPORTS
DEBT AS I  DEBT  AS X OF  EFFECTIVE DEFICIT A)  RATE  OF  OF  SAYING  AS  AS 1  AS 1
OrCOPp&/  c,port98/b/  EXCH. RAIE  % OF CDP'/  INFLATION  CROWTHd/  X OF CDPdI  OF coPd/  OF CDpd/
r  A[  average  41.5  (3)  204.7  (2)  98.3  (3)  -8.4 (2)  23.2  (3)  4.8 (2)  18.7  (1)  24.3  (3)  24.7  (2)
61edan  48.6  199.8  9e.8  -8.9  13.6  6.8  19.2  23  8  22.3
1  t  quartile  24.2  118.3  94.4  -9.2  9.8  2.6  14.6  19.8  16.6
3,d  quartilo  49.3  277.0  101.7  -3.6  19.8  8.3  22.1  28.2  29  4
04t  average  39.8  (2)  208.2  (3)  97.9  (2)  -7.0  (3)  21.3  (2)  3.9 (3)  13.9  (3)  23.6  (2)  24.7  (31
Wie:ian  34.9  160.1  99.1  -6.2  11.8  3.8  14.3  21.8  20.4
1' quartile  22.3  11.0  96.1  -7.1  8.9  2.7  2.9  15.7  12.0
3rd  quartl  to  46.8  320.8  101.2  -2.1  16.9  4.9  24.0  30.8  34.4
NA!  average  29.7  (1)  144.8 (1)  97.8  (1)  -4.4  (1)  12.2  (1)  6.6 (1)  14.8 (2)  22.8  (1)  29.9  (1)
Mledidan  28.1  112.8  97.8  -3.6  11.4  4.8  16.4  21.8  29.1
1 5t  quartil  18.9  78.6  94.2  -7.7  9.1  3.8  10.0  18.8  18.3
3 d  quarti  l  37.0  128.8  100.6  -1.4  13.3  7.0  19.8  26.8  30 e
'ourco  World  Eanl  dota.
a.  The  ratios  are  computed  using  data  in  current  US dollars;  the  period  covered  is  1976-80.  The data includ-  total  disbursed  guaranteed  an-'  non-guaranteed
debt.
f.Iorts  of  goods  and non-factor  sorvices  aro  obtained  from  balance  of  payments  stotistics  in  the  World  Bank date  file.
1  7  - column  corsiders  only  the  average  for  the  period  1978-80  and is  based  on  IIMF date;  Algeris,  Bolivia,  Indonesia  and Jsmsics  have  date  ave  lab:e  only
.'-.e  1979,  Guinee-Bis..u  and  Morocco since  1978.  and  Brazil.  B.,rkina  Foso  China,  Congo,  Greece,  Niger  and  Portugal  since  1917.
d/  The  ratios  are  calculated  with  data  in  constant  local  currency.
Note:  The  numbers  in  parentheses  are  the  rankings  of  the  country  groups  for  that  indicator  (1beat'  is  one).
f,l710  tSPiFQ
90  F  sTABLE  2
COUNTRY  PERFORMANCE
Ratio of  Ratio of
Ret. of Growth  DItow,.stic  Ss ing to GDP  Investment to CDP  Ratio of Exports to CDP
1970-80  1981-84  1985-88  1970-80  1981-84  1985-88  1970-80  1981-84  1985-88  1970-80  1961-84  1985-88
F  . .....  A  Z'  II  1()  4 2 (I)  16  7  (I)  (4 6t  (I)  I? 2 (1)  24  1  (3)  19 9 (I)  10  6  (I)  24  7  (2)  25I  1f 2)  20  I  (1)
'16  6  3  7  1127  147y  IS  2(a  19  0  I6  3  2',)1  34  6
.~~  o..~~%.'*  2  S  I  2I  0  14'  09  I  96  I',  Lb  '5  12 
14  o.,.,6,I.  6  2 7  6 0  L2  1  10  19 I  62  2  21)  29 4  30  I  3 
I  11)  II2)  I  0(2)  (3  9  (3)  (2)  2  13  3  (3)  23 6  (2)  72  0(2)  2'lI  (1)  24 7(1)  24 4  (3)  23 6  (1)
*  do...  . 4  9  ~~~3  9  3  9  24 0  21  1  16 6  30 a  2b 11  21 2  34 4  25,  3  2 
44  S  ())  1 ~~~~~I(  (I  2  7  13)  1  46  (2)  44  0  (3)  144(2  2  6  (1)  24  I,  (3)  20 0  (2)  29 9 (I)  716  1) (1  ?-4  (2)
46  /  6  2  2  1  4  44  (1  2?6  77?  21  a  29  1  253  7/0
.1  *.*.~~~~.  . I  6  I  2  0  7  100  7  9~~~~~~~  96  a  I?  I  ii 0  1  6 3  II9  1 
1  ..  . 3 9  I  96  20 0  19 2  25 a  2? 3  23 2  36 6  32? I  4 
Sou,ce: World Ban),  data.
h.  at,,  are  calculated with date in  constant  local currency.
Note: Th. f,qu,oa in parentheses  indicate th. ranking. of th. country groups for that  indicator ('best  a  on.).
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X  i-i-g0TABLE  3
SELECTED  INDICATORS  OF  POLICY  STANCE
221jIf2ijj  EJ(  h-mat-  i-  FIL  of  Ftp 5 1 .Qijjo.jb!~n.  .'.  4..o  fp  ~  ~  95~P, 9 j  *
19708  0  1901-82  1983-84  1985.08  1970  so  1982  82  1903  84  lo9s0788  2970  80  2902-82  1983-84  2985  as  1970  80  1901  82  193  O.  1982.  so
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A.-.97  8 (2)  106  7  (2)  118  7  (3)  115  0  (3)  -4  4  (1)  -6 7 (2)  -,70  (2)  -6  4  (2)  12  2  (1)  13  5  (I)  15  2  (2)  135  7  (2)  6  7(2)  12  6  ()  I7  (2)  5  6  27)
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(X[-  1-90)FOTABLE  4A
EXTERNAL  SHOCKS
1981-84 Relative to 1970-30  1986-88  Relative to 1970-80  .'I9-88  Relative to 1981-84
Terus  Roal  Total  Terws  Reel  Total  Terus  Real  Total
of  Int.  Shock  of  Int.  Shock  of  Int.  Shock
Trade  Rate  Trade  Rate  Trade  Rate
EIAL  -10.6  -1.9  -12.4  -o.0  -3.2  -9.2  1.1  -0.2  0.9
CAL  -2.9  -2.0  -4.9  -3.4  -3.6  -7.0  -0.4  -0.6  -1.0
hAL  -10.4  -1.2  -11.6  -13.9  -2.0  -16.9  -3.3  -0.3  -3.8
Source: World Bank data.
Note:  The total effect of the  external shocks as  a % of CDP  is computed  as the sum  of the  real
interest rate offect and the terms of trade offect. The interest rate  effect is calculated as  -(r-
rbas*):(debt/GDP)be,  where r is the real interest rate computed as  (i-dp/p)/(1+dp/p); rb,s  is the
averag  resl intereit rate of the base period (1976-80) or (1981-84); i is the  rat;o of  intorest
payments to  total debt;  interest payments  are calculated  by adding public  interest payments  to
private interest payments; private irterest payments are proxied by multiplying private debt by L
(L equals the thr-4-month annualized LIBOR plus 1%);  private debt is  estimated by  subtracting public
and publicly guaranteed debt from total debt; dp/p is 'world' inflation (proxied by the percentage
change of the CNP  deflator  in the US, and (debt/gdp)  is the ratio of debt to GOP  in the  year
preceding the beg nning of the end reriod.  The debt dat9 correspond to total disbursed guaranteed
and non-guaranteed debt.  The debt and interest  rate information is available  starting ii  1976 only.
Therefore, the average for the par;cd 1970-1980 is estimated using information  for the period 1975-
80.
Th-  effect  of  the  terms  of  trsde  is  computed  as  ((PX/PXbas,)-13J(X/CDP)  -((PM/PUbase)-
1)S(U/CDP)beg, where PX and PM are the average export and  import  price indices deflated  by the US
GNP deflator,  respectively; PX Jaso  and PWbase are the average price indices of the base period; X
and U  are exports and imports o'?  goods and non-factoral services; and (X/CoP)b,g  and (U/CDP)be* are
the ratios of X and W to CDP  respectively in the yeor preceding the beginning of the end peFiod.





TOTAL  EXTERNAL  SHOCKS
1981-84  Relative  1985-88  Relative  1985-88  Relative
to  1970-80  to  1970-80  to  1981-84
EIAL  average  -12.4  -9.2  0.9
Median  -13.6  -10.1  0.7
,St  quartile  -17.1  -13.3  -2.3
3 rd  quartile  -8.9  -3.3  3.4
CAL  average  -4.9  -7.0  -1.0
Median  -6.3  -6.9  -1.5
]st  quartile  -16.8  -13.1  -5.2
3 rd  quartile  -1.9  0.5  2.1
NAIL  average  -11.6  -15.9  -3.6
Median  -10.8  -11.2  -1.6
rSd  quartile  -20.6  -25.0  -7.1
3r  quartile  -2.1  -5.2  0.0
Source:  *orld Bank data,
Note: The  total  effoct of  the  external shocks  as  a X of  CDP is  computed  as  tho  sum of  the real  interest  rate s^a  te-.s
of  trade  *ffects.  The  ;nterest  rate  effect  is calculated  ae  -(r-rb,Se)*(debt/COP)b* 9 ,  whern  r  iS the  reoal  --. eest
rate  computed  as  (i-dp/p)/(l-dp/p);  rrbs  is the averago  real  intorest  rete  in  base poriod  (1975-80);  (198  -84.
is  the  ratio  of  interest  peyments  to  tote1  debt;  interest  payments  are calculated  by  adding  public  and  privste  -te-est
payments;  privste  interest  payments  are  proxied  by  multiplying  private  debt  by  L  (L  oquolo  three-month  annualized  .:39R
plIQ  1%);  private  debt  is estimated  by  subtracting  public  and publicly  guaranteed  debt  from  totol  debt;  dp,p  S
'world'  inflation  (proxied  by  the percentage change  in  the  CNP deflator  of  the  US,  end  (debt/gdp)bl 9 ie  the  aSt  o  6f
debt  to  GOP  in  the  year  preceding  the beginning  of  tho  and  period.  The debt  data  correspond  to  total  d  sb..sed
guaranteed  and non-guerenteed  debt.  Oebt  and interest rate informaeion  is  avsi  lable starting  in  1975  only.  Yhsefo  e
the  average  for  the  period  1970-80  is *etimated  using  information  for  the  period  1976-80.
Tie  effect  of  the  terms of  trade  is  computed  as  ((PX/PXbaa  )-  )C(X/GOP)b4  -((PM/pMb  se)-)*(W/CDP)beg,  wh  vs  Px  I'd
P4  are  the  everage export  and  import  price  indices  deflate  by  the  US CNI9  deflator,  respectively;  PXb4se  sd  oase
a-a  the  evorage  price  indices  of  the base  period,  X and M are  exports  and imports  of  GNFS;  and (X/COP)b.n  and (Wi/ZP  p
a,o  the ratios  of  X and W to  COP respectively  at the year  preceding  the  6.ginning  of  the  end period.  A  I th  oa  . *s9
a-e  denominsted  in  current  US dollars.
. 5,  ,005
3*  }.iTABLE  5
NON-OFFICIAL  EXTERNAL  FINANCING  BEFORE  AND  DURING  ADJUSTMENT
NET  FLOW AS  % OF GDP
1975-80  1981-82  1983-84  1985-88
EI  A  1.8  3.3  0.4  0.0
OAL  3.0  1.1  0.6  0.5
NAL  1.1  3.1  2.2  -0.2
Source:  World  Bank  data.
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TABLE 5.1  A
CONTROL-GROUP  ESTIMATES OF THE PROGRAM  EFFECTSV/
(ratios  at current  prices)
Perlcds  Change  in  Change  ir.  Change  in  Change  in
CrDmpared  GDP Growth  Investment/CDP  Saving/GDP  Exports/GDP
1985-88  0.017  -0.015  0.014  0.042
with  (2.402)  (-1.108)  (0.839)  (2.023)
1970-80
i985-88  0.028  0.017  0.021  0.042
with  (3.141)  (1.498)  (1.438)  (3.070)
1981-84
a/ As measured by the coefficient of the program dummy, 0,,  of equation (2).  The
t-values are in parentheses.
TABLE 5.1  B
CONTROL-GROUP  ESTIMATES OF THE PROGRAM  EFFECTS/
(ratios  at constant prices)
Periods  Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in
Compared  GDP Growth  Investment/GDP  Saving/GDP  Exports/GDP
1985-88  0.017  -0.031  -0.013  0.038
with  (2.402)  (-1.786)  (-0.620)  (1.603)
1970-80
1935-88  0.028  0.017  0.025  0.018
with  (3.141)  (1.322)  (1.516)  (1.466)
1981-84
a/ As measured by the coefficient of the program dummy, 6,,  of equation (2).  The
t-values are in parentheses.TABLE 5.2
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  PROBIT ESTHIATES  OF THE STATUS  PARTICIPATION  EQUATION
VariabIe  Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Stat.  2-Tail Sig.
CONSTANT  -3.338  1.881  -1.775  0.081
CACC6  -15.269  6.685  -2.284  0.026
NETF6  7.731  5.183  1.491  0.141
RER2  0.020  0.012  1.667  0.101
SHOCKI  -3.156  1.583  -1.994  0.051
DEBT6  2.652  1.525  1.  -8  0.087
INV2  -8.692  4.574  -1.4v.  0.062
D.'  2.045  0.715  2.858  0.006
D2  0.266  0.672  0.396  0.693
D3  -2.469  1.033  -2.389  0.020
D6  0.725  0.637  1.138  0.259
D7  3.540  1.008  3.511  0.001
DINFLAC  -1.465  0.658  -2.223  0.030
Ncte: Log  likelihood  a  -24.99;  pseudo  R2 = 0.50.
Number of observations:  77.  The pseudo  R 2 measure  is equal  to [1-(log L,)/(iog L].  where
L, denotes  the maximum  of the  likelihood  function when  maximized  with  respect  to all  .. e
parameters,  and L. is the maximum when maximized  with  respect to the constant  term oniv.TABLE  5.3  A
MODIFIED  CONTROL-GROUP ESTIMATES  OF THE PROGRAM EFFECTS!'
(constant prices)
(1985-88 relative  to  1970-80)
C  GDPI  INVI  SAVDOM1  EXPI  RER1  FISCi  SHOCK2  d
Change  in  0.004  -0.613  0.032  -0.014  -0.034  -0.000  -0.052  -0.026  0.016
GDP growth  (0.133)  (-5.164)  (0.693,  (-0.425)  (-1.198) (-0.003) (-0.742) (-1.358)  (1.988)-
Change  In  0.009  0.854  -0.561  -0.014  0.021  0.000  -0.086  0.037  -0.035
investmentlGDP  (0.128)  (3.339)  (-5.509)  (-0.173)  (0.427)  (0.609) (-0.764)  (0.724) (-1.725).-
Change in  -0.094  1.336  -0.011  -0.345  0.004  0.000  0.079  -0.010  0.014
savinglGDP  (-0.972)  (3.975)  (-0.084)  (-3.281)  (0.065)  (0.707)  (0.513) (-0.187)  (0.542)
Change  in  -0.092  -0.412  0.634  -0.295  -0.179  0.001  0.621  -0.074  0.065
exportsfGDP  (-0.700)  (-0.753)  (3.746)  (-1.816)  (-2.005)  (0.487)  (2.852) (-0.833)  (2.023)
No:e: The t-values are in parentheses.
*  Statistically significant  at  the 2.5%  level.
**  Statistically significant  at  the 52 level.
***  Statistically significant  at the 7.5Z  level.
Statistically significant  at the 10%  level.
al  Estciation of  equation  (9),  using d as  the  instrument of  d.TABLE 5.3  B
MODIFIED  CONTROL-GROUP ESTIMATES OF PROGRAM EFFECTS!'
(constant prices)
(1985-88 relative to  1981-84)
C  GDP2  INV2  SAVDOM2  EXP2  RER2  FISC2  SHOCK3  d
Change  in  0.009  -0.750  0.057  -0.030  -0.015  0.000  0.028  0.026  0.020
CDP Growth  (0.625)  (-11.480)  (1.521)  (-0.989)  (-0.708) (0.643)  (0.883)  (0.459)  (2.561)
Change In  0.027  0.006  -0.343  0.092  -0.022  0.000  -0.052  0.081  0.001
Investment/GDP  (0.908)  (0.063)  (-4.986)  (1.635)  (-0.662)  (0.360) (-0.860)  (0.806)  (0.039)
Change  in  -0.026  0.116  0.095  -0.238  0.069  0.000  -0.029  0.128  0.037
Saving/GDP  (-0.702)  (0.860)  (0.795)  (-2.714)  (1.249)  (0.306) (-0.312)  (1.199)  (2.186)
Change in  -0.006  0.086  0.035  0.027  0.069  -0.000  0.000  0.063  0.025
ExportslCDP  (-0.219)  (0.817)  (0.494)  (0.508)  (1.522) (-0.849)  (0.006)  (0.688)  (1.640)
Note:  The t-values  are in parentheses.
*  Statistically significant  at the 2.5 1 level.
**  Statistically significant  at the 5 t level.
***  Statistically significant at the 7.5 t level.
****  Statistically significant  at the 10 t level.
al Estimation of  equation  (9), using d as instrument of d.33
Appendix  A
All the data used in the analysis are taken from the World Bank's ANDREX
data base except the real exchange rate,  which is from IMF statistics.  The
sample consists of 77 developing countries, listed in Table B by group and by
middle- and low-income.  The sample period is 1970-88.
The variables are defined for three periods:  (1970-80, first; 1981-84
second; and 1985-88 third.  The number following the variable is the period,
i.e., GDP1 is the rate of GDP growth in period 1.  Variables  with a  number 4
mean period 3 relative to period 1,  with number 5, period 3 relative to period
2, and with number 6, period 2 relative to period 1).
Following is a description of the variables:
(i)  For periods 1, 2 and 3
GDP_ :  rate of GDP Growth
INV_ :  domestic investment to GDP ratio
SAVDOM_ :  domestic saving to GDP ratio
EXP_ :  total exports to GDP ratio
(ii)  Defined for periods 1 and 2
RER  :  real exchange rate index
FISC_  fiscal deficit to GDP ratio
(iii)  Others
SHOCK1 :  total external shock (positive),  period 2 relative to period 1.
SHOCK2 :  total external shock (positive), period 3 relative to period 1.
SHOCK3 :  total external shock (positive), period 3 relative to period 2.
NETF6  :  change in non-official external financing to GDP ratio, period 2
relative to period 1.34
(iv)  Duzmmy  variables
D :  1 for ELAL countries (program  countries), 0 otherwise
DI :  1 if a country has a recurrent program with IMF, 0 otherwise
D2  1 if a country is African, 0 otherwise
D3 :  1 if a country is Latin American, 0 otherwise
D6 :  1 if a  country is middle-income, 0 otherwise
D7 :  1 if a  country highly indebted, 0 otherwise
DINFLAC : 1 if a  country had a  rate of inflation over 60S in
period 2, 0 otherwise.- 35  -
TABLE  A.1
COUNTRY  CLABBIFICATION
I.  3IAL  (Early  Intensive  Adjuatuent  Lending  25 Countries)A/
Bolivia  *  Mauritius
Brazil  Mexico
Chile  Morocco
Colombia  Nigeria  *
Costa  Rica  Pakistan  *
Cote  d'Ivoire  Philippines
Ghana  *  Senegal  *
Jamaica  Tanzania  *
Kenya  *  Thailand
Korea,  Republic  of  Togo  *
Madagascar  *  Turkey
Malawi  *  Zambia  *
Mauritania  *
1I. OAL  (other Adjustment  Lending  25 Countries)W/
Argentina  Indonesia
Bangladesh  *  Mali  *
Burkina  Faso  *  Niger  *
Burundi  *  Panama
Central  African  Republic  *  Sierra  Leone  *
China  *  Somalia  *
Congo,  People's  Republic  of the  Sudan  *
Ecuador  Tunisia
Guinea  *  Uruguay
Guinea-Bissau  *  Yugoslavia
Guyana  *  Zaire  *
Honduras  Zimbabwe
Hungary
III. NAL  (No Adjustment  Lending  2B Countries)WV
Algeria  Malaysia
Benin  *  Myanmar  *
Botswana  Nicaragua
Cameroon  Oman
Dominican  Republic  Papua  New Guinea
Egypt,  Arab  Republic  of  Paraguay
El Salvador  Peru
Ethiopia  *  Portugal
Greece  Rwanda  *
Guatemala  Sr.  Lanka  *
Haiti  *  Syrian  Arab  Republic
India  *  T-rinidad and Tobago
Jordan  Venezuela
Liberia  *  Yemen  Arab  Republic  *
p/ EIAL are  countries  that have received  2  SALs  or  3 or  more  adjustment  operations,  with  the  first  adjustment
operation  in  1985  or  before.
D/ OAL are other adjustment  tending  countries.
c/ MAL are  countries  that  did not  receive  AL in  the  par;od  1980 to  1989.
*  Low  incr_  countries  that  are IDA  countries;  and middt  income  countriee  are  non IDA countries.
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INDICATORS  OF  PERFORMANCE: EIAL  COUNTRIES
GOPI  GDP2  GOP3  INVI  INV2  INY3  SAVDOMI  SAVDOM2  SAVDOM3  EXPI  EXP2  EXP3
Boliv.a  0.048  -0.027  0.000  0.223  0.108  0.091  0.20k  0.174  0.091  0.294  0.281  0.  20
Brail  0.084  -0.006  0.048  0.230  0.178  0.170  0.210  0.190  0.221  0.079  0.119  0.128
Chile  0.024  -0.007  0.063  0.181  0.139  0.149  0.146  0.109  0.173  0.158  0.231  0.286
Colombia  0.069  0.020  0.04  0.186  0.209  0.17'  0.192  0.171  0.211  0.166  0.138  0.177
Costs Rica  0.068  0.003  0.037  0.222  0.16  0o.  146  0.167  0.215  0.276  0.301  0.310
Coto d'lvoire  0.082  -0.002  0.014  0.200  0.184  0.  k17  0.161  0.168  0.360  0.365  0.310
Ghana  -0.001  -0.018  0.063  0.072  0.048  O.k  071  0.042  0.046  0.132  0.073  0.0o2 Jamaica  -0.011  0.013  0.008  0.284  0.190  0.Iw  .183  0.097  0.119  O.4S3  0.603  0.712 Kenya  0 068  0.022  0.082  0.306  0.214  0.18,  0.281  0.191  0.178  0.871  0.281  0.256
Korea, Rep,  of  0.096  0.088  0.108  0.286  0.310  0.322  0.230  0.290  0.391  0.242  0.370  0.421
Madagascar  0.003  0.031  0.020  0.198  0.101  0.108  0.107  0.000  0.010  0.166  0.099  0.096
Malawi  0.063  0.014  0.023  0.320  0.193  0.120  0.128  0.148  0.094  0.227  0.208  0.231
Mauritani%  0.017  0.004  0.037  0.282  0.376  0.267  0.07S  -0.012  0.172  0.372  0.409  0.533
Mauritius  0.006  0.040  0.089  0.297  0.206  0.328  0.296  0.197  0.396  0.527  0.470  0.680 Mexico  0.062  0.019  0.006  0.227  0.210  0.164  0.207  0.244  0.191  0.096  0.142  0.187
Morocco  0.06  0.027  0.058  0.251  0.241  0.242  0.148  0.144  0.202  0.214  0.100  0.167 Nigeria  0.086  -0.047  0.027  0.194  0.159  0.079  0.207  0.119  0.089  0.223  0.112  0.122
Pakistan  0.047  0.088  0.087  0.190  0.190  0.187  0.0906  0.147  0.178  0.129  0.132  0.144 Philippmnes  0.083  0.004  0.020  0.284  0.254  0.146  0.230  0.206  0.164  0.1I  0.207  0.260 Senegal  0.025  0.031  0.044  0.184  0.168  0.146  0.038  0.010  0.02S  0.208  0.29s  0.246 Tanzania  0.061  0.008  0.036  0.260  0.208  0.200  0.162  0.110  0.076  0.194  0.131  0.102 Thailand  0.072  0.062  0.088  0.273  0.261  0.241  0.221  0.209  0.221  0.217  0.260  0.317
Togo  0.034  -0.017  0.032  0.338  0.248  0.216  0.287  0.201  0.124  0.2e9  0.463  0.433
Turkey  0.069  0.047  0.082  0.220  0.204  0.204  0.140  0.142  0.160  0.072  0.164  0.212
Ziabia  0.007  0.002  0.029  0.411  0.149  0.148  0.447  0.111  0.146  0.400  0.307  0.342
Average  0.048  0.016  0.042  0.243  0.195  0.177  0.167  0.143  0.161  0.247  0.261  0.276
Note:  CDP  rate  of  growth  of  GDP;  INV_  gross  domestic  investment  to  CDP  ratio;  SAVDOM  groas  do_etic saving  to COP ratio;  EWP  total  exports  to  CDP ratio. Tho  numbers  after  the  variablei  mean period  1,  period  2  and period  3.
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